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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PLAYING HOT POTATO WITH COPA: THE SUPREME COURT
DEFERS DECIDING WHETHER THE CHILD ONLINE
PROTECTION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ONCE AGAIN

I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following: one day after school, your child goes online to
complete a homework assignment requiring the research of a favorite cartoon
character. Using a popular search engine, your child types in “Pokemon” and
begins a search. The search retrieves well over five million results. Your child
scrolls through the search results and selects a website. This particular
website, to which your child was allowed unfettered access, happens to be
pornographic with extreme, graphic examples of sexual behavior.
Surprisingly, many major children’s characters, including “Pokemon,” “My
Little Pony,”1 and popular names such as “Disney,” “Barbie,” and “ESPN,”2
are linked to thousands of pornographic websites. In fact, the unintentional
exposure to online pornography experienced by your child is commonplace: of
the 95% of 15-17 year olds who have used the Internet, 70% have accidentally
stumbled across pornography.3 Inevitably, after your child’s encounter with
online pornography, you immediately appreciate a larger problem. While the
Internet serves as a wonderful teaching tool for your child, providing access to
educational resources and the opportunity to explore hobbies and interests, it
also contains harmful material, which you, your child’s school and library, and
perhaps the government need to shield children. To your astonishment, you
discover that the Supreme Court has twice left undecided the issue of whether
the government can directly address this problem through Internet regulation.
Indeed, the problem of youth, pornography, and the Internet is expansive.
Today’s computer-literate and Internet-savvy child explores an Internet
containing more than 4.2 million pornographic websites. 4 The average age of
1. How Children Access Pornography on the Internet, at http://www.protectkids.com/
dangers/childaccess.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). ProtectKids.com is an Internet service aimed
at increasing awareness of children’s exposure to online pornography and the ways parents and
others can combat the negative impact such exposure has on children’s development.
2. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
3. Id.
4. TopTenREVIEWS, Internet Pornography Statistics, at http://internet-filterreview.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
TopTenREVIEWS, comprised of product and industry experts, reviewers, marketers, and editors,
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a child’s first exposure to Internet pornography is 11 years old;5 90% of 8-16
year olds have viewed pornography online with the majority of the exposure
having occurred while the youths were doing homework.6
Experts agree that exposing a child to graphic sexual material is harmful in
many ways. 7 Such exposure threatens to make children victims of sexual
violence.8 One in five children utilizing computer chat rooms have been
approached over the Internet by pedophiles.9 Eighty-nine percent of online
sexual solicitations in 2001 were made in either chat rooms or via Instant
Messages—communication programs that thirteen million children use
regularly.10 Further, exposure to pornography may incite children to act out
sexually against other children.11 Such exposure also interferes with a child’s
development and identity.12
Considering the accessibility of online pornography and the harm that such
materials pose to children, the Supreme Court has recognized that society
possesses a substantial interest in protecting its minors from the harmful effect
of obscene material found online. 13 Indeed, the scope and range of interested

is an online service aimed at aiding consumers seeking to buy Internet filters by providing
research results pertaining to filtering software and the scope of the online pornography problem.
TopTen REVIEWS, Company Profile, at http://www.toptenreviews.com/about-us.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005).
5. TopTenREVIEWS, Internet Pornography Statistics, at http://internet-filter-review.
toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
6. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
7. See Harms of Porn and Resources, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005) (finding that exposure to Internet pornography threatens to make children
victims of sexual violence; frequently results in illnesses, unplanned pregnancies, and sexual
addiction; may incite children to act out sexually against other children; shapes attitudes; and
interferes with a child’s development and identity).
8. Id.
9. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
10. Id.
11. Harms of Porn and Resources, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2005). See also ProtectKids.com, Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at
http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (describing two
incidents where children between the ages of 11 and 13 viewed graphic, explicit materials online
immediately preceding violent or sexual behavior).
12. How Pornography Harms Children, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/harms.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). “Pornography often introduces children prematurely to sexual
sensations that they are developmentally unprepared to contend with. This awareness of sexual
sensation can be confusing and over-stimulating for children.” Id.
13. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency
Act, a statute prohibiting transmission of obscene online communications to minors, as
unconstitutional: “We agreed that ‘there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors’ which extended to shielding them from indecent messages
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parties is extensive, including schools, parents, libraries, concerned citizens, as
well as sellers of technology-based Internet protection systems, and the online
adult entertainment industry as a whole.
However, irrespective of the need for Internet regulation, the Supreme
Court has been unwilling to subject cyberspace to government regulation equal
to that imposed on other communication media, namely radio and television.14
Certainly, content-based regulation of any expressive medium raises First
Amendment issues because the First Amendment provides that the government
has no power to restrict expression based on the content of its message, its
ideas, or its subject matter.15
On October 22, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Child
Online Protection Act, (“COPA”), seeking to shield children from sexually
explicit Internet material by requiring the owners of pornographic websites to
install age-verification systems on their webpages.16 The following day, the
American Civil Liberties Union, (“ACLU”), filed suit to challenge COPA’s
constitutionality. 17 COPA’s constitutionality has now been argued twice
before the Supreme Court: first in 2002, (“Ashcroft I”), where the Court
limited the scope of its decision in order to exclude any holding on the
constitutionality of COPA, effectively failing to give Congress guidance as to
the Supreme Court’s position on such Internet regulation,18 and then in 2004,
(“Ashcroft II”), where Supreme Court left in place a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of COPA and sent the case back to a federal district court

that are not obscene by adult standards” (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
14. Robert Corn-Revere, Ashcroft v. ACLU II: The Beat Goes On, 2004 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 299, 310 (2004) (describing the Court’s treatment of other media, where it allowed
government regulation of content, in comparison to its treatment of the Internet).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 302.
17. Supreme Court Leaves COPA Injunction in Place: Ashcroft v. ACLU, ANDREWS
TELECOMM. INDUS. LITIG. REP., Jul. 13, 2004, at 3.
18. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2002) [hereinafter “Ashcroft I”]. The
majority asserted:
The scope of our decision today is quite limited. We only hold that COPA’s reliance on
community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors does not by itself
render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment. We do
not express any view as to whether COPA suffers from substantial overbreadth for other
reasons, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, or whether the District Court
correctly concluded that the statute likely will not survive a strict scrutiny analysis once
adjudication of the case is completed below. While respondents urge us to resolve these
questions at this time, prudence dictates allowing the Court of Appeals to first examine
these difficult issues.
Id.
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in Pennsylvania to be decided on the merits, yet again unwilling to give its
opinion concerning the constitutionality of the act. 19
Certainly, those monitoring the COPA debate and Internet censorship had
hoped that Ashcroft II would provide real answers as to the Supreme Court’s
However, to the
position on governmental Internet regulation. 20
disappointment of Congress and other interested parties, the constitutionality
of COPA remains in question because the Ashcroft II Court made only a basic
interlocutory decision, finding that the federal district court did not abuse its
discretion by enjoining the enforcement of COPA.21 Nevertheless, the
Ashcroft II opinion gives some insight as to the Court’s stance, its reluctance to
allow direct regulation of the Internet.
This article will discuss the wide-ranging implications of the Court’s
recent observations in Ashcroft II. In choosing to decide Ashcroft II on an
interlocutory matter, a narrow, practical holding, the Court deprived Congress
of the guidance it needed regarding Internet regulation legislation. By
asserting that filtering software may be less restrictive than COPA, the Court
has all but eradicated any hope that the Court might find COPA
constitutional,22 thereby sending Congress back to the drawing board to draft
another law designed to shield minors from harmful internet materials.23

19. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2783, 2791 (2004) [hereinafter “Ashcroft II”]
(“Because we affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction for the
reasons relied on by the District Court, we decline to consider the correctness of the other
arguments . . .”).
20. Emily Vander Wilt, Comment, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second
Attempt to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 406, 434 (2004).
Wilt’s article relays that those following the COPA debate felt confident that the Court would
resolve the COPA issue in the October 2003 Term. Wilt, writing before Ashcroft II came before
the Court, predicted that “[a]fter consuming innumerable hours of judicial resources and
engendering a wealth of speculation about its destiny, the constitutionality of COPA will finally
be settled this Term, when the Supreme Court considers the statute for the second time [in
Ashcroft II].” Id.
21. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2791.
22. Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, Framed by the Times: 2003-2004 U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions Reflect Current Events, 40 TENN. B. J. 14, 19 (2004) (“[I]n [Ashcroft II] the
court affirmed a trial court’s preliminary enjoining of COPA’s enforcement and likely struck a
fatal blow to a second congressional attempt to combat online pornography”). The majority
asserted:
Filters are less restrictive than COPA. They impose selective restrictions on speech at the
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source. Under a filtering regime, adults
without children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to
identify themselves or provide their credit card information . . . Filters also may well be
more effective than COPA.
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.
23. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795. The Court implies that Congress should continue
enacting statutes like COPA by stating, “On a final point, it is important to note that this opinion
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Further, the Ashcroft II decision implies that the majority may believe that the
government lacks a direct role in Internet regulation 24 and demonstrates the
Supreme Court’s protectivism of the Internet as a medium for free, unfettered
communication.25
This author finds that filters are unequal to regulation by the government,
which would require that publishers of pornographic websites utilize age
verification systems, because filters require the public to take the initiative to
turn on and use the filtering devices.26 Even if the government were to
implement incentive programs encouraging parents’, schools’, and libraries’
use of filtering software, 27 filters do not block out as much Internet
pornography, while simultaneously allowing innocuous speech, as would
direct governmental regulation.28 As such, filters do not effectively combat the
societal evil inherent in allowing minors unrestricted access to harmful,
pornographic materials.29

does not hold that Congress is incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to
prevent minors from gaining access to harmful materials.” Id.
24. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer concludes that a belief
that the government has no direct role in regulating the Internet might have influenced the
majority’s decision: “I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken
the view that the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area.” Id.
25. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions, 7 GREEN BAG 323, 333 (2003) (“[T]he
Supreme Court is once again being protective of the internet as a medium for communication and
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”). See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at
868-69 (striking down the Communications Decency Act, a statute prohibiting transmission of
obscene online communications to minors, as violating the First Amendment and distinguishing
the Internet from other communications media).
26. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (noting that inherent in a filtering system is “[t]he need
for . . . cooperation” from the public).
27. Id. at 2793. The majority suggests that “Congress can give strong incentives to schools
and libraries to use [filters].” Id.
28. Id. Even the majority acknowledges that “[f]iltering software . . . is not a perfect solution
to the problem of children gaining access to harmful-to-minors materials” because filters “may
block some materials that are not harmful to minors and fail to catch some that are.” Id.
29. The focus of this article with regard to filtering systems is conceptual, grounded on a
basic knowledge of filters’ functioning, rather than providing a technologically in-depth analysis.
For a thorough report on protecting children from internet pornography, including extensive
analyses of filtering technologies, see COMMITTEE TO STUDY TOOLS & STRATEGIES FOR
PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRAPHY, COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BOARD NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 51 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin
eds., 2002) [hereinafter YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET]. The report explains
generally how filters function:
Filtering technologies allow Internet material or activities that are deemed inappropriate
to be blocked, so that the individual using that filtered computer cannot gain access to that
material or participate in those activities. Typically, material is determined to be
inappropriate on the basis of its source, its content, or the labels that have been associated
with it. Determination of inappropriate content can be accomplished by computer-based

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

482

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:477

The following section will describe the history behind the regulation of
sexually explicit material and the litigation history of COPA preceding
Ashcroft II. Part III, the analysis, will analyze the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions of Ashcroft II. Part IV, the author’s analysis, will explore
the effects and implications of the Court’s holding in Ashcroft II.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT
MATERIALS
Ashcroft II was not the first time the Supreme Court encountered
legislation aimed at protecting children from inappropriate, harmful material.
Indeed, on more than one occasion, Congress has attempted, through statutory
enactments aimed at shielding minors from pornography, to carve out as
unprotected by the First Amendment an area of expression based on its
obscene content.30
To meet First Amendment standards, the government must carefully tailor
the scope of statutory enactments like COPA to the law’s goal, namely
shielding minors from obscene online material, so as to ensure that speech is
restricted no further than is necessary.31 Once enacted by Congress, each of
these laws is inevitably challenged by groups with First Amendment
concerns.32 The act trickles through the court system, ultimately reaching the
Supreme Court whose decision and opinion ideally uphold the law as
constitutional, thereby allowing the law to take effect, or give Congress
valuable guidance as to why the law is or is not constitutional. When a
plaintiff challenges such a content-based speech restriction as overly broad, the

methods, by a combination of computer-based methods and human judgment, or by
human judgment alone.
Id.
30. Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right? A Summary of
Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
721, 723 (2004) (listing recent congressional enactments pertaining to children and online
pornography: Communications Decency Act of 1996, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,
Child Online Protection Act (1998), Child Internet Protection Act (2000), Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003).
31. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870-71, 874 (holding that in order to avoid violating
First Amendment, the scope of a statute aimed at shielding children from online obscenities must
not be ambiguous; statute must effectively address aim of legislation because substantial
overbreadth of the statute indicates there exists a means of regulation less restrictive of free
speech rights, means that do not suppress speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive,
means that do not chill legitimate speech).
32. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 375 (describing the inevitable First Amendment challenges
faced by an act that restricts speech, like COPA, faces: “[u]nsurprisingly, the availability of
pornography on the Internet has led to extensive public criticism and, more importantly, to
numerous legislative attempts to restrict, regulate, reduce, burden and ban it. These endeavors
have met with consistent and considerable opposition . . .”).
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plaintiff must propose less restrictive alternatives to the statute. 33 To
overcome this challenge of unconstitutionality, the government must prove that
the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.34
In deciding these difficult First Amendment censorship issues, the
Supreme Court has developed a somewhat extensive precedential basis to
which Congress looked in drafting COPA and the Court looked thereafter in
deciding COPA’s fate in Ashcroft I and Ashcroft II.35 The following section
outlines the precedent on government-regulated censorship of sexually explicit
materials that came before Ashcroft II.
An underlying issue in the following precedent is the Court’s debate over
what level of scrutiny to apply in deciding the constitutionality of contentbased restrictions, like those imposed by COPA, on otherwise protected
speech. Theoretically, the Court employs a strict scrutiny standard in
reviewing any such statue.36 A traditional strict scrutiny analysis requires that
the content-based prohibition is 1) the least restrictive means of achieving the
aim of the regulation, and 2) narrowly tailored to accomplishing the aim of the
regulation so as not to chill otherwise legitimate speech.37 However, rather
than automatically applying the strict scrutiny standard to the content-based
restrictions discussed below, the Court has reduced the level of examination in
consideration of the type of medium.38
33. When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the Government, in order to
ensure that speech is restricted no further than is necessary to accomplish Congress’ goal, has the
burden to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.
See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2790.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 2788. The majority acknowledges that Congress used the Court’s previous
decisions in drafting COPA, noting that “Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on
this subject . . . .” Id.
36. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
535-36 (1980). The Court explained what the analysis required:
The Commission’s ban . . . is not, of course, invalid merely because it imposes a
limitation upon speech. We must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its
regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission’s arguments require us to
consider three theories that might justify the state action. We must determine whether the
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, (ii) a permissible subjectmatter regulation, or (iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state
interest . . . A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech may be
imposed so long as it is reasonable. But when regulation is based on the content of speech,
governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has
not been prohibited “merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.”
Id. (citing Niemotko v. Md., 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951).
37. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 434 n.216 (describing the “traditional strict scrutiny
formulation” as having two points of analysis 1) the “least restrictive alternative analysis,” and 2)
whether the regulation is “narrowly tailored”).
38. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (finding content-based restrictions
on the broadcasting medium do not merit strict scrutiny analysis).
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Obscenity

While the Supreme Court had decided in 1957 that materials defined as
“obscene” were unprotected by the First Amendment and therefore able to be
regulated by the government, 39 not until 1973, in Miller v. California,
(“Miller”), did the Court define obscenity so that Congress and the states could
effectively and constitutionally ban such material. The Miller Court held that
for a state law regulating obscenity to be constitutional, the law must have
limited application to material which 1) “the average person, applying
contemporary community standards’ would find . . ., taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest,” 2) “describes or depicts, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” and 3) “taken
as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”40 The
Court declared, “[w]e are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide
fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial
activities may bring prosecution.”41 A five- justice majority agreed that the
obscenity definition was narrow enough to provide “concrete guidelines to
isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the First
Amendment.”42 Thus, the Miller test screens obscene and illegal pornography
from the non-obscene and permissible pornography.43
B.

Child Pornography

In New York v. Ferber, (“Ferber”), a case decided in 1982, the Supreme
Court held that child pornography, like obscenity, is a distinct category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.44 Because the law in question

39. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech . . .”).
40. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wis. 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id. at 27, 29.
43. See, e.g., Wilt, supra note 20, at 382 (“Under the Miller test, some, but not all,
pornography will be found to be obscene”).
44. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (“When a definable class of material . . . bears
so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the
balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment”). At issue in Ferber was a New York
statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child under the
age of 16 by distributing material depicting such performance. Id. at 750. The court limited the
definition of the kind of child pornography, which was unprotected by the First Amendment to
“works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.” Id. at 764
(explaining that “[t]here are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography which, like
obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment . . . [a]s with all legislation in this sensitive
area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law. . .” and
that “[h]ere the nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense be limited to
works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age”).
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listed the forbidden acts with sufficient precision and adequately described that
category of material the production and distribution of which was not entitled
First Amendment protection, the Court found that the statute in question was
constitutional.45 In so deciding, the Court expanded the area of sexually
explicit material deemed unprotected by the First Amendment to cover child
pornography as well as the obscenity that Miller found unprotected.
C. Indecency
Remaining still is sexually explicit speech that is not obscenity under the
Miller definition or child pornography under the Ferber definition. Although
not technically “obscene,” this “indecent” material is also sexually explicit, but
the Court has chosen not to completely remove all indecency from First
Amendment protection as it did for obscenity and child pornography. Thus
far, the Court’s “indecency” decisions have been medium-specific: the level of
protection afforded is dependent on the medium in question, such as radio,
telephone, or cable television.46 The following cases provide an overview as to
the Court’s analyses of indecency as communicated through various mediums
other than the Internet.
Decided in 1969, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission was one of the first cases to suggest that the broadcasting medium
receives different treatment than other types of expression under the First
Amendment.47 The Court based its decision not to utilize a strict scrutiny
analysis and to reduce First Amendment protections for broadcasting on the
fact that radio frequencies are inherently limited in number.48 This scarcity,
the Court reasoned, allows the government to regulate radio stations in ways
that the First Amendment otherwise disallows regulation of other forms of
expression, such as written or spoken communications.49
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica, a 1978 case,50 the
Court found that 1) the “pervasive presence” of the broadcasting media gave a

45. Id. at 765-66.
46. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems”).
47. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (explaining that “[a]lthough
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by First Amendment interest, differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them”) (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 388 (“Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish”). Id.
49. Id.
50. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726, 729. The facts of the case revolved around a provocative radio
show broadcast at two o’clock in the afternoon about which the Federal Communications
Commission, (“FCC”), had received a complaint from a father whose young son heard the
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listener the right to be free from potentially offensive material “presented over
the airwaves” that “confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home,” and 2) the way in which radio is available to children,
“even those too young to read,” allows the broadcasting media to be
regulated.51 In fact, the Court recognized that “of all forms of communication,
it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.”52 Thus, the Court found that the government may regulate
broadcasting more than other communication media.53
Sable Communications of California Inc. v. FCC, (“Sable”), a 1989 case,
addressed a statute prohibiting the use of telephones as a means of providing
“indecent” or “obscene” communications for commercial purposes.54 Under
the Miller test, the Sable Court found that the statute was valid with respect to
its obscenity prohibition.55 However, the Court, choosing to apply a strict
scrutiny analysis, concluded that the statute’s restrictions on indecency were
unconstitutional. The Court found that a total prohibition on indecency was
not narrowly tailored and would, in effect, chill otherwise protected speech.56
Further, the Court held that the total ban on indecency in Sable was
unconstitutionally overbroad because the government did not prove that less
restrictive alternatives would be ineffective.57 The Court differentiated
telephones from indecent broadcasting which requires a less-than-strictscrutiny analysis. Radios, the Court held, are more pervasive because once a
radio is turned on, the listener hears any offensive material that may be
broadcast, whereas one can avoid the material at issue in Sable by simply

broadcast. Id. The Court addressed the issue of whether Congress could constitutionally regulate
indecent speech in broadcasting. Id.
51. Id. at 748-49.
52. Id.
53. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51.
54. Sable, 492 U.S. at 117 (stating, “The issue before us is the constitutionality of §223(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934. The statute . . . imposes an outright ban on indecent as well as
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages”). Id. The particular telephone service in
question operated as follows: upon calling an adult message number and being billed, callers were
able to hear “sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages.” Id. at 117-18.
55. Id. at 124-25 (explaining that because the statute applied the ‘“contemporary community
standards’ requirement” upheld in Miller as a standard for obscenity, “there is no constitutional
stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of commercial telephone
recordings”).
56. Id. at 131 (holding that the statute “is not a narrowly tailored effort to serve the
compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages”).
57. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (finding that the statute, “in its present form, has the invalid effect
of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to
hear” and, as such, the statute “is another case of ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’” (quoting
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
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choosing not to call the telephone service in question. 58 Thus, stringently
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court strikes down regulations
prohibiting indecent telephone services.
In 1996, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, (“Denver Area”), the Court decided the constitutionality of three
provisions of a statute aimed at reducing children’s exposure to indecent
material on cable television.59 The Court refused to create a single standard of
scrutiny that would apply to all future media cases and utilized a more flexible
strict scrutiny approach that involved balancing the importance of the problem
addressed by the statute against the level of restriction the statute imposed on
speech.60
However, in 2000, the Court in United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., (“Playboy”), did not use the “flexible” strict scrutiny test of
Denver Area, but rather clearly established that strict scrutiny was required for
content-based regulation of cable.61 Noting the essential difference between
cable and broadcasting, the Court stated, “Cable systems have the capacity to
block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis.”62 The Court
held that because less restrictive means were available, namely a system
requiring cable operators to completely block offensive material for patrons

58. Id. at 127-28 (“In an emphatically narrow holding, the Pacifica Court concluded that
special treatment of indecent broadcasting was justified” because “it did not involve a total ban on
broadcasting indecent material” and the Court “relied on the unique attributes of broadcasting . . .
[that] can intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning as to program content”).
59. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 727 (1996).
60. Id. at 743-44. (“The First Amendment interests involved . . . require a balance between
those interests served by the access requirements themselves (increasing the availability of
avenues of expression to programmers who otherwise would not have them) and the disadvantage
to the First Amendment interests of cable operators and other programmers (those to whom the
cable operator would have assigned the channels devoted to access)”) (citations omitted).
Utilizing the balancing strict scrutiny test, the Denver Court found only one provision
constitutional. That provision authorized cable operators to choose not to show indecent
materials and provided operators with flexibility to choose how to respond to the needs of their
children and unconsenting adult audience. The other two, unconstitutional provisions, required
operators to confine all indecency to one channel that subscribers could access only after written
request to the operator for access to that channel. Id. at 733.
61. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Since [the statute] is a
content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny”). In Playboy, a
supplier of adult programming and owner of adult networks, sought a permanent injunction
against the Telecommunications Act of 1996, requiring cable operators to either completely
scramble a sexually explicit channel so that nonpaying customers would not experience “signal
bleed,” where “either or both audio or visual portions of scrambled programs might be heard or
seen” by nonpaying customers, or to restrict operating hours of such a channel. Id. at 807-08.
62. Id. at 815.
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requesting such blocking rather than requiring operators to scramble all
sexually explicit channels, the statute failed strict scrutiny.63
Thus, the precedent on content-based indecency restrictions demonstrates
that the Court, in consideration of the type of medium involved, does not
automatically apply strict scrutiny.64 Because the pervasiveness of radio
broadcasting takes away listeners’ freedom to choose whether or not to hear
offensive material, the Court reduces the level of scrutiny so as to allow the
government to regulate the radio.65 However, because telephone services and
cable television provide patrons with the choice of whether to access such
material, the Court applies strict scrutiny in an effort to protect such
communications from government regulation.66 It is against this precedential
backdrop that indecency regulation of a new medium, the Internet, came to the
Court.
D. The Communications Decency Act
Passed during the tremendous spread of the Internet during the 1990s, the
Communications Decency Act, (“CDA”), addressed Congress’ concerns with
the increasing availability of online pornography to children by creating
penalties for the offense of “indecency,” the sending of offensive material over
the internet.67 CDA’s penalties were limited by two affirmative defenses: 1)

63. Id. at 823 (“There is no evidence that a well-promoted voluntary blocking provision
would not be capable at least of informing parents about signal bleed (if they are not yet aware of
it) and about their rights to have the bleed blocked (if they considered it a problem and have not
yet controlled it themselves)”).
64. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (finding content-based restrictions on the
broadcasting medium do not merit strict scrutiny analysis); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (holding that
the cable television medium, as opposed to the broadcasting medium, requires strict scrutiny).
65. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. The Court found that 1) the “pervasive presence” of the
broadcasting media gave a listener the right to be free from potentially offensive material
“presented over the airwaves” that “confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home,” and 2) the way in which radio is available to children, “even those too
young to read,” allows the broadcasting media to be regulated more. In fact, the court recognized
that “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.” Id.
66. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court struck down
regulations prohibiting indecent telephone service); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (utilizing strict
scrutiny when evaluating cable regulation).
67. Wilt, supra note 20, at 376 (“With the tremendous growth and spread of the Internet
during the 1990s came an unprecedented accessibility to pornography and other sexually explicit
material. Concerned about the increasing availability of such materials to children . . . Congress
passed the CDA, which criminalized the transmission or display, via any telecommunications
device or interactive computer service, of any indecent material to any person under the age of
eighteen”). Recall that indecency remains protected speech; it is neither obscene nor child
pornography, materials that the Court has said are unprotected and can therefore be regulated by
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protecting those who had taken “in good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions under the circumstances” to shield children from harmful
material, 68 and 2) covering those who restricted access by requiring proof of
age such as credit card or an adult identification numbers.69
In 1997, in the case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, (“Reno”),
the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional CDA’s provisions enacted
to protect children from “indecent” and “patently offensive” Internet material,
terms that CDA did not define, thereby rendering the act overly broad and in
violation of the First Amendment rights of adults.70 While CDA provided that
“patently offensive” materials were to be determined by “contemporary
community standards,” a standard that the Miller Court had upheld as
constitutional in defining obscenity, the statute lacked the qualifications and
limitations possessed by the Miller definition.71
The Court utilized a strict scrutiny approach. In choosing to apply “the
most stringent review” of CDA, the Reno Court pointed out the importance of
the Internet as a new, immensely wide-ranging medium that, unlike radio or
television, is less invasive because communications over the Internet do not
appear on an individual’s computer unbidden.72 Further, CDA differed from
statutes that had come before the Court earlier where the Court had upheld
content-based restrictions of sexually explicit material because CDA 1) did not
allow parents the option of consenting to their children’s exposure to restricted
materials, 2) was punitive, and 3) was not limited to commercial transactions.73
Having failed on their first attempt to regulate children’s exposure to explicit

the government, and the Court has routinely applied a strict scrutiny standard to indecency. See
discussion supra pp. 9-13.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (2003).
69. Id. at § 223(e)(5)(B).
70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875. The Court held:
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting
children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults . . . [t]he Government may not “reduc[e] the
adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”
Id. (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 873 (finding that CDA lacks two limitations of the Miller test: 1) “that the
proscribed material be ‘specifically defined by applicable state law,’” a requirement that “reduces
the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term ‘patently offensive’ as used in the CDA,” and 2)
that the Miller definition was “limited to ‘sexual conduct,’” as opposed to the CDA which
includes non-sexual conduct such as “excretory activities”).
72. Id. at 868-69 (relaying the findings of the district court that “communications over the
Internet do not invade an individuals home or appear on one’s computer unbidden” and that it is
“seldom [that one] encounter[s] content by accident”).
73. Id. at 864-69.
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Internet material, Congress went back to the drawing board to draft COPA
with the holding of the Reno Court in mind.74
E.

The Child Online Protection Act

While COPA shares CDA’s primary aim, the prohibition on the
transmission of certain indecent materials by imposing criminal and civil
sanctions for such activity, Congress modified COPA in accordance with the
Reno Court’s criticisms of CDA.75 Congress limited the scope of COPA: 1)
COPA applies only to commercial materials;76 2) COPA applies only to
materials on the World Wide Web,77 not to the Internet outside the World
Wide Web such as e-mails and chat rooms to which it is impossible to restrict
minors’ access;78 and 3) COPA changes CDA’s vague “indecent” and
“patently offensive” standard to a “harmful to minors” standard which is
clarified by a three prong test that further defines what materials are harmful to
minors.79

74. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (“[I]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to
our earlier decisions . . . in particular the decision in Reno . . . For that reason, ‘the Judiciary must
proceed with caution and . . . with care before invalidating the Act’”) (quoting Ashcroft I, 535
U.S. 564, 592).
75. Id.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2003) (“Whoever . . . makes any communication for commercial
purposes . . .”). Congress narrowed COPA’s scope in this respect in response to the Court’s
findings in Reno. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 (noting that the CDA differs from other statutes
upheld in that it was not limited to commercial transactions).
77. § 231(a)(1) (“Whoever . . . by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication . . .”).
78. COPA narrowed its scope in this respect in response to the Court’s findings in Reno. See
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 855-56 (finding that that “there is no effective way to determine the
identity or the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail . . . newsgroups or chat
rooms”).
79. § 231(a)(1) (“Whoever . . . makes any communication . . . that includes material that is
harmful to minors . . .”); Kosse, supra note 30, at 730 (noting that COPA “was noticeably
narrower than the CDA . . . the standard was changed from the [CDA’s] ambiguous, indecent and
patently offensive standard to a harmful to minors standard”). Under COPA’s three prong test to
determine whether liability will attach and to identify whether material is “harmful to minors,” it
must be proven that:
1. the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
2. depicts, describes or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and
3. taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.
§ 231(e)(6)(A)-(C).
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One day following its enactment, the ACLU brought suit to challenge
COPA.80 Since its enactment, injunctions have prevented COPA from taking
effect.81
F.

Ashcroft I

In Ashcroft I, the Court upheld COPA’s use of “contemporary community
standards” to identify harmful-to-minors material, finding that the use of that
standard alone did not render the act overbroad.82 The Court in Ashcroft I
specifically limited the scope of its decision to the issue of COPA’s use of
community standards, choosing not to address whether COPA was
substantially overbroad for other reasons or unconstitutionally vague.83 The
Court, in an 8-1 decision, vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded the
case to the court of appeals to reconsider whether the district court had been
correct to grant the preliminary injunction.84
III. ANALYSIS OF ASHCROFT II
The Supreme Court granted certiorari again and in June 2004 ruled against
the government in Ashcroft II by a 5-4 margin.85 Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas with whom Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred.86 The majority applied a strict

80. Kosse, supra note 30, at 730-31 (stating that “[t]he day after COPA became effective,
the ACLU filed suit claiming that the statute violated the First and Fifth Amendments because it
was vague and infringed upon the protected speech of adults”).
81. Id.
82. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 584-85. The plaintiffs argued that the use of community standards
rendered COPA overbroad because it would “require Web publishers to shield some material
behind age verification screens that could be displayed openly in many communities across the
Nation if Web speakers were able to limit access to their sites on a geographic basis.” The Court
found that COPA’s reliance on community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors
does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.
Unlike the CDA’s use of the contemporary community standard, the Court explained, COPA’s
scope is narrower, applying to a limited amount of material, namely only commercial
communications on the World Wide Web, and defining the harmful-to-minors standard in a
manner similar to that upheld in Miller. Id.
83. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2790 (stating that the Ashcroft I Court “emphasized . . . that
[the] decision was limited to that narrow issue” of whether the community-standards language
made COPA unconstitutional).
84. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 564, 586. For a brief overview of legislation passed since 1996
related to shielding children from sexually explicit materials found on the Internet, see the chart
formulated by Susan Hanley Kosse in her article that summarizes Internet pornography laws
aimed at protecting children. The chart chronologically depicts the legislation and litigation
related to Internet regulation. Kosse, supra note 30, at 724.
85. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2787, 2795.
86. Id. at 2787.
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scrutiny analysis.87 The issue decided by the court was whether the federal
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction was correct.88 The Court
upheld the injunction, explaining that there was a substantial likelihood that the
plaintiffs would prevail on their argument that COPA does not meet strict
scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives, namely filters, exist.89 Justice
Breyer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.
Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent.90 In this interlocutory decision, the
Court simply refused to lift a court order stopping enforcement of the
provisions of COPA and did not decide COPA’s constitutionality, remanding
the case on that issue back to the Third Circuit.91
A.

Majority Opinion

The majority began by explaining the focus of its analysis, the
interlocutory matter of whether the lower court’s decision to grant the
injunction was proper.92 With this narrow focus delineated, the majority
expressly declined to consider the correctness of the other arguments that the
court of appeals relied upon in affirming the injunction, namely the court of
appeal’s consideration of the constitutionality of COPA’s terms.93 The Court
87. Id. at 2791 (stating the applicable standard of scrutiny used for content-based speech
restrictions is whether “‘less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve’”) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at
874). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[T]he [Ashcroft II] case is notable because
the Court used strict scrutiny in evaluating government regulation of sexual speech”).
88. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (explaining that they “must decide whether the Court of
Appeals was correct to affirm a ruling by the District Court that the enforcement of COPA should
be enjoined because the statute likely violates the First Amendment”).
89. Id. at 2795 (holding that “the Government has not shown that the less restrictive
alternatives proposed by respondents should be disregarded” and that “[t]hose alternatives,
indeed, may be more effective than the provisions of COPA” and, therefore, “[t]he District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it entered the preliminary injunction”). The court also gave
procedural reasons for upholding the injunction and remanding the case for a fully trial on the
merits:
First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of leaving it in
place by mistake . . . Second, there are substantial factual disputes in the case . . .
Third . . . the factual record does not reflect current technological reality—a serious flaw
in any case involving the Internet.
Id. at 2794.
90. Id. at 2787.
91. Id. at 2795.
92. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (explaining Ashcroft II’s procedural history: “This case
comes to the Court on certiorari review of an appeal from the decision of the District Court
granting a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision of the District
Court for abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion . . .”).
93. Id. at 2791 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in entering the preliminary injunction” but “our reasoning . . . is based on a narrower,
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concentrated primarily on the issues addressed by the district court: the
plaintiff’s contention that there existed less restrictive alternatives to COPA
and whether the government met its burden of proving that the plaintiff’s
proposed alternatives would not be as effective as the challenged statute.94 The
majority provided two main analyses 1) the less-restrictive-alternative analysis,
and 2) procedural reasons for remanding the case.95
First, the majority found that filters are less restrictive than COPA because
filters “impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end not
universal restrictions at the source” as are imposed by COPA’s requirement
that users identify themselves before allowing access to material.96 A “filtering
regime” allows adults, by simply turning the filter off, to access speech that
they have a right to see without having to comply with COPA regulations, such
as providing credit card information or identifying themselves.97 Whereas
COPA condemns as criminal a certain category of speech and requires website
publishers to use age-verification systems at the source of the speech, (“source
regulation”), a filtering regime condemns no speech, blocking certain speech
when triggered to do so by key words found in a received communication,
(“end regulation”), and thereby creates no chilling effect on speech.98 Thus, the
majority found that filters are less restrictive.99
Moving on, the majority determined that filters may be more effective in
censoring sexually explicit material because filters block objectionable content
regardless of where it originates, whereas COPA blocks only content posted on
the United State’s World Wide Web.100 Further, because filters can apply to
other means of Internet communication, like e-mail, filters are more effective
than COPA, which applies only to websites on the World Wide Web.101 Thus,
under COPA, children can still access harmful Internet material originating in
foreign countries, material that filters can block.102 Internet providers can
elude COPA’s restraints easily by moving their operations to foreign
locations.103 Additionally, the age-verification systems required by COPA, the
majority stated, “may be subject to evasion and circumvention, for example by
more specific grounds than the rationale of the Court of Appeals . . . none of [the Court of
Appeal’s] constructions of statutory terminology . . . were relied on by or necessary to the
conclusions of the District Court[,]” and thus, “we decline to consider the correctness of the other
arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals”).
94. Id. at 2792.
95. See id. at 2783-2795.
96. Id. at 2792.
97. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.
103. See id.
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minors who have their own credit cards.”104 Thus, COPA failed to pass strict
scrutiny: not only are filters less restrictive, but the government also failed to
demonstrate that COPA is more effective, that it reaches more pornographic
materials that are harmful to minors, than the proposed less restrictive
alternative, namely filters.105
The majority then addressed two of the government’s arguments against
filters as reasonable alternatives to COPA. The majority conceded that filters
might block some non-harmful materials and allow access to some harmful
materials.106 But irrespective of this possibility, the majority found that the
government failed to disprove that overall filters were less effective than
COPA’s “source regulation.”107 Practically, the majority reasoned, remanding
the case for a full trial would allow for presentation of new evidence on this
point, new evidence regarding the effectiveness of current filtering
technology.108 Then, responding to the government’s argument that filters are
not an acceptable alternative because Congress cannot require their use, the
majority held that congressionally enacted incentive programs could encourage
the use of filters in schools and libraries.109 The majority continued, holding
that the need for voluntary parental use of filters did not automatically
disqualify filters as an available alternative because a court should not presume
that parents, given complete information, would fail to use filters.110 Thus, the
Court concluded, filters are an effective alternative because “[b]y enacting
programs to promote use of filtering software, Congress could give parents
[the] ability [to monitor what their children access online] without subjecting
protected speech to severe penalties.”111
Moving on to its second reason for affirming the district court’s imposition
of a preliminary injunction, the majority provided four practical reasons for
letting the injunction stand pending a full trial on the merits.112 First, the
majority noted that “the potential harms from reversing the injunction
outweigh[ed] those of leaving it in place”—the harm in allowing COPA to take
effect at the risk of chilling protected speech outweighed the harm of allowing
the injunction to stand and postponing COPA’s imposition of criminal
sanctions for a decision on the merits.113 Second, because substantial factual
disputes remained in the case, allowing the preliminary injunction to stand and

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 2792-93.
Id. at 2793.
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793.
Id. at 2794.
Id. at 2793 (citing United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)).
Id. (citing Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824).
Id. at 2793.
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794.
Id.
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remanding for trial forced the government to “shoulder its full constitutional
burden of proof respecting the less restrictive alternative argument, rather than
excus[ing] it from doing so.”114 Third, the majority reasoned that because the
factual record lacked updated technological information, a necessity in Internet
litigation, and contained only the five-year-old information used at the district
court level affirming the injunction, remanding for trial would allow the parties
to update and supplement the record with current technological findings.115
Finally, because of the court of appeal’s focus on COPA’s definitions as
rendering it unconstitutional, the court found that the parties had thus far been
unable to devote their attentions to proving the question of the relative
restrictiveness and effectiveness of COPA’s alternatives and remanding the
case would give the parties an opportunity to do so.116
B.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, agreed with the
majority’s less-restrictive-means analysis and gave a concurring opinion so as
to “underscore just how restrictive COPA is.”117 Justice Stevens found
COPA’s imposition of criminal prosecutions as a means of regulating obscene
materials was inappropriate in light of the vagueness inherent in any standard
of obscenity or indecency.118 Justice Stevens also noted that the interest in
protecting minors from viewing sexually explicit material may not warrant the
gravity of the criminal burdens imposed by COPA.119
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Breyer, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor
joined, argued that Congress could not protect children from exposure to
online commercial pornography in another manner that was less restrictive
than COPA.120 Justice Breyer examined 1) the burdens imposed by COPA, 2)
COPA’s ability to further a compelling interest, and 3) the proposed less
restrictive alternatives.121
Justice Breyer first argued that COPA limits its definition of regulated
material, harmful-to-minors material, to the definition of obscenity upheld in
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2794-95.
116. Id. at 2795.
117. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795-96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. (“Criminal prosecutions are . . . an inappropriate means to regulate the universe of
materials classified as ‘obscene,’ since ‘the line between communications which ‘offend’ and
those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct’” (quoting Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977)).
119. Id. at 2796-97.
120. Id. at 2787, 2798 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2798.
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Miller.122 The Miller definition held that material is obscene as to adults if it
“appeals to the prurient interest;” depicts sexual conduct in a “patently
offensive way;” and, “taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.”123 By adding to Miller’s definition, which would
otherwise cover only obscenity, the words “with respect to minors”124 and “for
minors,”125 COPA “only slightly” expands Miller’s obscenity definition to
cover harmful-to-minors material, specifically indecent material that
specifically “seek[s] a sexual response from” minors.126 Further, Justice
Breyer pointed out that COPA “does not censor the material it covers,” merely
requiring providers of harmful-to-minors material to screen those wishing to
access the site, a requirement that would impose little monetary costs to web
site owners.127 Additionally, the risk of embarrassment to users who might be
required to provide age-verification information to access a site does not
automatically violate the Constitution.128 Justice Breyer concluded that COPA
“at most imposes a modest additional burden on adult access to legally obscene
material, perhaps imposing a similar burden on access to some protected
borderline obscene material as well.”129 Thus, Justice Breyer found that the
First Amendment permits an alternative holding than that of the majority.
Construing COPA narrowly, allows reconciliation between COPA’s language
and the requirements of the First Amendment.130

122. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
124. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6)(A) (stating the first prong of the three prong test as to what
material is harmful to minors; defining material that is harmful to minors as that which “the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a
whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the
prurient interest”).
125. § 231(e)(6)(C) (giving the third prong of the test as to what material is harmful to
minors; defining material that is harmful to minors as that which “taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors”).
126. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that minors
are defined as “some group of adolescents or post-adolescents.” Id. See also, id. at 2800 (“In
sum, the Act’s definitions limit the statute’s scope to commercial pornography” and “[i]t affects
unprotected obscene material,” as defined in Miller. Thus, “[g]iven the inevitable uncertainty
about how to characterize close-to-obscene material, [COPA] could apply to (or chill the
production of) [only] a limited class of borderline material that courts might ultimately find is
protected”).
127. Id. at 2800-01 (stating that “[a]ccording to the trade association for the commercial
pornographers who are the statute’s target, use of such verification procedures is ‘standard
practice’ in their online operations”).
128. Id. at 2801. (“‘[T]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a
public library without any risk of embarrassment’”) (quoting American Library, 539 U.S. at 209
(plurality opinion)).
129. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2805.
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Turning to the question of whether COPA furthered a compelling interest,
Justice Breyer found that COPA significantly furthers COPA’s aim of
protecting minors from exposure to commercial pornography 131 because no
alternative to COPA exists that furthers COPA’s goal as effectively. Justice
Breyer found that filters are not an alternative legislative approach to shielding
children from online pornography.132 In fact, the availability of filters
constituted part of the problem, the “status quo,” to which Congress responded
by enacting COPA.133 Thus, in finding filters less restrictive than COPA, the
majority has essentially affirmed the status quo which, “by definition, . . . is
less restrictive than [any] new regulatory law” that goes beyond the status
quo.134 The relevant inquiry, Justice Breyer then found, was whether the status
quo, inclusive of filters, addressed the compelling interest and whether COPA
helped further that interest more than the filter-inclusive status quo.135 Justice
Breyer concluded that COPA’s age-verification requirements furthered the
compelling interest more than filtering because filters possess insufficiencies
that propelled Congress to enact COPA: 1) filtering allows some harmful
material to pass through unhindered; 2) filtering software costs money for
families to install; 3) filtering depends on parents deciding and enforcing at
which computer their children will use the Internet; 4) filtering blocks much
valuable, innocuous material.136
Justice Breyer then discussed the less restrictive alternative offered by the
majority.137 Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that government
encouragement of filter usage could be effective if the government designated
a vast amount of resources to giving parents and schools filters and training
them on how to use filters effectively.138 But, Justice Breyer noted, such an
expansive governmental program is extreme and expensive139 and “‘a judge
would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little
less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby
enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.’”140 Thus, Justice Breyer

131. Id. at 2801 (citing Denver, 518 U.S. at 743 (“interest in protecting minors is
‘compelling’”)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2801-02.
134. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2802.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2804 (stating, “I turn, then, to the actual ‘less restrictive alternatives’ that the Court
proposes. The Court proposes two real alternatives, i.e. two potentially less restrictive ways in
which Congress might alter the status quo in order to achieve its ‘compelling’ objective”).
138. Id.
139. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2804 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2804 (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
188-89 (1979) (concurring opinion)).
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found that incentive programs encouraging filter usage were not a reasonable
alternative to COPA.
In conclusion, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court’s holding presented
two more issues.141 First, the issue that the Ashcroft II Court again failed to
decide COPA’s fate, and remanded the issue yet again to the district court
“[a]fter eight years of legislative effort, two statutes, and [more than one]
Supreme Court case . . . .”142 Justice Breyer reminded the majority that
Congress, in passing COPA, adhered to the Court’s specific directives in Reno
concerning the characteristics of a statute that would successfully protect
children from exposure to online pornography while also protecting adults’
constitutional rights to access such material.143 Because COPA successfully
adhered to the Court’s directive in Reno and the Ashcroft II majority has
nonetheless held that COPA did not pass strict scrutiny, Justice Breyer
concluded that members of the Court might believe that the First Amendment
does not allow Congress to regulate the area of internet expression that COPA
addresses.144 If such is the case, Justice Breyer argued, then the Court should
“say so clearly” because holding that the act fails on less-restrictive-alternative
grounds and remanding the case once again seems to “promise” Congress
“legislative leeway” that might not exist if the majority believes that the
government has no role in internet regulation.145
Finally, Justice Breyer suggested that the majority’s holding, which rested
on a less-restrictive-means analysis, was ambiguous.146 The majority’s holding
did not answer the question of whether striking down COPA would amount to
more or less protection of speech.147 Justice Breyer explained that the
majority’s decision reduced the government’s options to either “ban totally,”
which suppresses legitimate speech as well as indecent speech, or “do nothing
at all,” which allows unprotected, obscene speech to circulate freely.148
Whereas, COPA, Justice Breyer elaborated, provided a “middle way:” rather
than prosecuting all obscenity to the maximum extent possible or doing
nothing at all, the government could, through COPA, insist that commercial
publishers of Internet pornography provide age verification screens on their
sites and, only if they fail to do so, prosecute them.149

141. Id.
142. Id. at 2804-05.
143. Id. at 2805.
144. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that some Members
of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the view that the First Amendment simply does not
permit Congress to legislate this area”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Breyer in finding
that COPA was constitutional. Justice Scalia, however, took issue with the fact
that both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent utilized a strict
scrutiny analysis when a less exacting standard was appropriate for
commercial pornography because, Justice Scalia found, such materials are
unprotected speech.150
IV. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS OF ASHCROFT II
The Supreme Court’s treatment of COPA in Ashcroft II, deciding the case
on an interlocutory matter rather than addressing the constitutional issue, has
significant bearing on COPA’s future. An analysis of the circumstances
surrounding and possible motivations behind the Court’s decision proves a
fruitful analysis in terms of predicting the fate of COPA and Internet regulation
as a whole.
Generally, the October Term of 2003, in which the Court decided Ashcroft
II, was a fairly typical representation of recent Supreme Court terms.151 The
Court decided the exact same number of cases that it did the year before and,
of those decisions, roughly the same proportion were 5-4 decisions.152
Notably, the Ashcroft II decision veers from the Supreme Court’s usual
practice and the other decisions of the October Term of 2003 in two respects.
First, the 5-4 opinion in Ashcroft II does not follow the customary pattern.
The Ashcroft II decision was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with whom Justices Breyer,
O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia dissented.153 This differs from the usual
[COPA] tells the Government that, instead of prosecuting bans on obscenity to the
maximum extent possible . . . it can insist that those who make available material that is
obscene or close to obscene keep that material under wraps, making it readily available to
adults who wish to see it, while restricting access to children. By providing this third
option—a “middle way”—[COPA] avoids the need for potentially speech-suppressing
prosecutions.
Id.
150. Id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Nothing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by COPA to that
exacting standard of review. “We have recognized that commercial entities which engage
in the sordid business of pandering by deliberately emphasizing the sexually provocative
aspects of [their nonobscene products] in order to catch the salaciously disposed, engage
in constitutionally unprotected behavior.” There is no doubt that the commercial
pornography covered by COPA fits this description.
Id. (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 831 (Scalia J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
151. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (analyzing some of the significant decisions of the
October 2003 term).
152. Id. (stating that the Court decided the same number of cases in the previous term as it did
in the October 2003 term in which the Court decided 73 cases after briefing and oral argument, 21
of which were 5-4 decisions).
153. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2787.
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composition of the majority in 5-4 decisions: Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.154 The Ashcroft II majority does not even
follow the second most common majority in 5-4 decisions: Justice Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.155 This anomaly in the Justices’
usual voting patterns indicates that there is likely some issue in Ashcroft II that
distinguishes it from the typical Supreme Court case.
Second, also inconsistent with past practice, the Ashcroft II Court left open
the issue of COPA’s constitutionality.156 The Supreme Court decided the
relatively simple interlocutory matter and remanded the merits to the lower
court.
Rather than following usual practice of deciding the merits
simultaneously with procedural issues, the Court opted to wait for COPA to
return again. 157 This break from usual Supreme Court practice ignited
speculation that the Court might have particular concerns with the issues
involved in Ashcroft II.
Indeed, the Supreme Court treated COPA differently, breaking from past
practice perhaps in response to some particular issues inherent in COPA and
Ashcroft II. The following analysis of the Ashcroft II decision discusses some
of the reasons for and implications of the Supreme Court’s decision.
A.

Failing to Give Congress Guidance

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Ashcroft II was the Court’s express
decision to make no decision on the merits. Although Ashcroft II was decided
on June 29, 2004, the last day of the Supreme Court’s October 2003 term, 158 it
is unlikely that the Court’s eagerness to finish the term explains their failure to
give Congress concrete guidance regarding COPA’s constitutionality.
Stopping short of reaching the merits, Ashcroft II is merely “a garden-variety

154. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (stating that of the 21 5-4 decisions in the October
2003 term, “[a]s always, the most common majority in the 5-4 rulings was comprised of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas”).
155. Id.
156. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323-24. Chemerinsky
notes that the October 2003 term left unresolved many issues: “[T]he Court left open important
questions by issuing only a narrow holding.” Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 324. See, e.g.,
Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that a disabled person may sue state governments
under the Americans with Disabilities Act but neglecting to address whether other suits may be
brought against states under the act); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (holding
that an individual may sue under the Alien Tort Claims Act but failing to clearly establish when
suits will be allowed).
157. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 324. (“I cannot think of
any recent Supreme Court Term where so much was left undecided. All of these issues will now
be faced by the state courts and the lower federal courts. Ultimately, almost all of these questions
will return to the Supreme Court in the years ahead for further clarification”).
158. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (noting that the October
Term 2003 ended on June 29, 2004, the day that Ashcroft II was decided).
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interlocutory decision in which the court simply refused to lift a court order
stopping enforcement of [COPA’s] provisions.”159 In doing so, the Court
consciously passed up an opportunity to end the debate over COPA’s
constitutionality, instead allowing the debate to continue slowly through the
court system.160
Three points illustrate the majority’s failure to give Congress clear
directives. First, the language of the Court’s opinion is indicative of the
majority’s intentional indecisiveness on the issue, stating only that filters
“may . . . be more effective than COPA.”161 While the Court acknowledges
imperfections in filters, the majority is unwilling to concretely express its
position as to whether such imperfections render filters less effective than
COPA.162 Rather, the Court only states that the government has the burden of
showing that filters are less effective, 163 a conclusion based on evidentiary
matters and one that affords any interpretation as to the Court’s position other
than as providing direct guidance as to the Court’s position on COPA’s
constitutionality.
Second, the Court expressly avoids giving its stance as to the effectiveness
of filters by giving vague, procedural rationales for remanding the case.164 The
Court states that remand will allow the parties to present updated evidence as
to the effectiveness of filters because such information “might make a
difference.”165 After many years of legislating and litigating COPA, Justice

159. Bernard James, First Amendment: What ‘Locke’ Portends, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 2, 2004 at
S10 (reviewing First Amendment decisions of Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 term). Bernard James
is a professor of constitutional law at Pepperdine University School of Law. Id.
160. Id. (arguing that as a result of the Court’s failure to decide COPA’s constitutionality,
“the debate over its constitutionality crawls to trial”).
161. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. The Court, in its review of the evidence considered by the
District Court in making the decision to grant the preliminary injunction, stated that filters “are
less restrictive than COPA” and “may well be more effective than COPA.” Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2793 (finding that filters “may block some materials that are not harmful to minors
and fail to catch some that are”) (emphasis added).
163. Id. (“Whatever the deficiencies of filters . . . the Government failed to introduce specific
evidence proving that existing technologies are less effective than the restrictions in COPA[,]”
and, thus, “[i]n the absence of a showing as to the relative effectiveness of COPA and the
alternatives proposed by respondents, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to
grant the preliminary injunction”).
164. Id. at 2794. The majority explains “important practical reasons” for remanding the case:
First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of leaving it in
place by mistake . . . Second, there are substantial factual disputes in the case . . .
Third . . . the factual record does not reflect current technological reality—a serious flaw
in any case involving the Internet.
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794.
165. Id. at 2795 (emphasis added) (noting that the evidence relied upon by the Court is that
relied upon by the District Court which is five years old and “[b]y affirming the preliminary
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Breyer, in his dissent, expresses confusion with the majority’s decision to
remand the case for further proceedings.166 Justice Breyer begs the rhetorical
question:
What [further] proceedings [are needed]? I have found no offer by either party
to present more relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated? I know the
Court says that the parties may ‘introduce further evidence’ as to the ‘relative
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.’ But I do not
understand what that new evidence might consist of.167

As such, the “important practical reasons” provided by the majority for its
decision to remand were vague, leaving the government and Justice Breyer
confused as to what other evidence the government must present.
Finally, as noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent and acknowledged by the
majority, Congress wrote COPA in response to the Court’s holding in Reno
regarding content-based restrictions on Internet pornography.168 Justice Breyer
states:
Congress read Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a
statute that would meet each and every criticism of the predecessor statute[, the
CDA,] that this Court set forth in Reno. It incorporated language from the
Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard, virtually verbatim. And it
created what it believed was a statute that would protect children from
exposure to obscene professional pornography without obstructing adult access
to material that the First Amendment protects. What else is Congress
supposed to do?169

Unfortunately, Congress cannot look to the Ashcroft II decision to answer
Justice Breyer’s question because the Ashcroft II Court failed to give Congress
clear guidance as to how COPA failed the Reno Court’s directives, choosing
instead to skirt the issue by deciding the case on grounds other than the merits.
Although the majority stated that “Congress is [not] incapable of enacting
any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from gaining access
to harmful materials,” 170 Ashcroft II basically sends Congress away without
direction to attempt blindly to formulate an act that the Supreme Court may or
may not validate. Indeed, the Ashcroft II opinion does not offer many
possibilities to Congress. The Court, in deciding a mere interlocutory matter,
injunction and remanding for trial, we allow the parties to update and supplement the factual
record to reflect current technological realities”).
166. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2805 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 2788. The majority states that “[i]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration
to our earlier decisions on this subject, in particular the decision in Reno . . . .” Ashcroft II, 124
S.Ct. at 2788 (citation omitted). See also id. at 2805 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that
“Congress passed [COPA] in response to the Court’s decision in Reno”).
169. Id. at 2805 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 2795.
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simply contrasted end regulation against source regulation, finding end
regulation might be a less restrictive alternative.171 Although the majority did
give Congress one offhand suggestion, that Congress might enact incentives to
encourage volitional filter usage,172 the Ashcroft II Court did not provide
Congress with an in-depth explanation of this suggestion, any statutory
interpretation of COPA, or any other guidance regarding what type of Internet
regulation law might pass constitutional muster.173
Contrary to the majority, the dissenting opinions suggest ways in which a
more in-depth reading might, at least, give Congress more guidance and, at
best, produce an entirely different result. Justice Scalia suggested lowering the
standard of scrutiny applied to COPA.174 Justice Breyer conducted a narrow
reading of COPA.175 Conversely, the majority simply decided the matter on
interlocutory grounds and neglected giving Congress any guidance other than
that Congress still may be able to enact a constitutional statute that regulates
the Internet.176
Ashcroft II’s shallow, interlocutory decision was surely a disappointment
to Congress. Indeed, the majority failed to foreclose any possibilities: the
Court may or may not find filters are a viable alternative to COPA; the Court
may find new evidence that may or may not be presented on remand “make[s]
a difference”177 as to COPA’s constitutionality; the Court may or may not find
the government can sufficiently prove filters are ineffective; and the Court may
or may not take into account that COPA is based on the Court’s directives in
Reno. The Ashcroft II decision leaves the government confused regarding the
Court’s position on COPA and, more generally, “source” regulation designed
to shield minors from online pornography. Justice Breyer conjectures that
171. Id. (“On this record, the Government has not shown that the less restrictive alternatives
proposed by respondents should be disregarded. Those alternatives, indeed, may be more
effective than the provisions of COPA”) (emphasis added).
172. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the]
development [of filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents”).
173. Id. at 2791. The Court expressly stated that its holding was confined to the interlocutory
matter and that it confined its rationale narrowly as well, deciding the matter “on a narrower,
more specific grounds than the rationale the Court of Appeals adopted.” Id.
174. Id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority “in subjecting COPA to strict
scrutiny” because “[n]othing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by
COPA to that exacting standard of review”).
175. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer notes that COPA’s terms, which the
Court of Appeals found too broad, are nearly identical to those validated as narrow enough in
Miller. Thus, Justice Breyer finds a narrowing construction to be a valuable analysis. Ashcroft II,
124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Corne-Revere, supra note 14, at 324 (noting
Justice Breyer’s concerted effort to narrowly read COPA: “Justice Breyer’s dissent is remarkable
for its unusual reading of the ‘harmful to minors’ standard. His effort to bring a heightened level
of precision and to narrow the variable obscenity standard is a worthy goal . . .”).
176. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795.
177. Id.
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“some Members of the Court . . . [may] have taken the view that the First
Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate this area.”178
However, Justice Breyer states that if that view is the impetus for the
majority’s decision, then the Court should have indicated that to Congress in
Ashcroft II.179
B.

Role of Federal Government in Internet Regulation

As Justice Breyer suggests in his dissent, the reasoning behind the
majority’s decision in Ashcroft II may be that the majority believes that the
federal government has no place, no constitutional role, in directly regulating
the Internet.180 Illustrative of this are the majority’s statements indicating a
preference for end regulation, such as filters, that “impose selective
restrictions . . . at the receiving end,” as opposed to source regulation, such as
COPA, that imposes “universal restrictions” on internet providers that are
enforced by the government through criminal and civil sanctions.181 If the
Court prefers end regulation to direct government control at the source of
online pornography, then the Court takes the primary responsibility for
protecting children from harmful Internet materials out of the government’s
hands.
Confirming this position in his concurrence, Justice Stevens finds that it is
parents’ responsibility to protect children from harmful Internet material.
Taking issue with COPA’s imposition of civil and criminal liability on
offenders, Justice Stevens explains his “growing sense of unease when the
interest in protecting children from prurient materials is invoked as a
justification for using criminal regulation of speech as a substitute for, or a
simple backup to, adult oversight of children’s view habits.” 182 Further, in
support of end regulation as a preferable alternative to COPA, the majority
explains that parents can turn on filters when children use the computer and
then turn off “the filter on their home computers” to “obtain access” to
otherwise filtered speech.183 Clearly, the majority sends the message that
parents, not the government, are to be their children’s censors. 184 Having
implied that the government lacks a direct role in Internet regulation, the
Supreme Court has demoted the societal interest in shielding children from
178. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
179. Id.
180. Id. (“I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the
view that the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area”).
181. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.
182. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2792.
184. See In Loco Parentis, N.J. L. J. , Jul. 5, 2004, at 22 (arguing that the Ashcroft II decision
communicates that “[i]n a free society, parents must be their children’s censors: Censorship is not
a job for the federal government”).
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online pornography, sending the message that the goal of COPA is not
urgent.185
Considering that the Ashcroft II Court seems to imply that the government
lacks a direct role in Internet regulation, why did the Ashcroft II Court not
direct Congress to stop wasting its time attempting to enact a statute aimed at
protecting children from pornography dependent on direct government
regulation? In his dissent, Justice Breyer asks this question as well and, not
finding an answer, states that if the Court feels that the federal government
should not regulate Internet speech, it “should say so clearly.”186 Until the
Court clearly states its position, Congress will not know whether to continue to
enact legislation concerning Internet regulation through direct governmental
enforcement.
C. Filters vs. COPA
Based on the evidence before them, the Ashcroft II majority found that
filters may be a less restrictive alternative to COPA, 187 and thereby, that the
government may have no direct role in Internet censorship.188 The following
section analyzes this finding by 1) providing an empirical study of filters and,
based on this exemplar, analyzing 2) whether the volitional use of filters is an
effective means of controlling children’s access to harmful Internet
pornography, and 3) whether filters are less restrictive of legitimate speech.
The following study evaluates the effectiveness of filters by analyzing the
content of information blocked by filters, that is, the relative amounts of
pornography versus the amounts of non-obscene, legitimate speech blocked by
filters.189 This study also presents an accurate portrayal of how most filters
work: filters usually operate on some form of word-blocking; users turn on a

185. See id. (arguing that by implying that the government lacks a direct role in Internet
regulation, the Ashcroft II Court indicates that “[a]cting in loco parentis is not the most effective
use of Congress’s time”).
186. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2795.
On this record, the Government has not shown that the less restrictive alternatives
proposed by respondents should be disregarded. Those alternatives, indeed, may be more
effective than the provisions of COPA. The District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it entered the preliminary injunction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id.
188. See In Loco Parentis, supra note 184, at 22 (arguing that the Ashcroft II decision
communicates that “[i]n a free society, parents must be their children’s censors: Censorship is not
a job for the federal government”).
189. See Kate Reder, Ashcroft v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again, or Does
the International Problem of Regulating Internet Pornography Require an International
Solution?, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 139, 148 (2004) (summarizing the purpose and results of the
study).
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filter and may set the level of blocking desired, from a very restrictive
configuration to a less restrictive setting.190
The Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a study, (“Kaiser study”), that
tested the material blocked from various websites, including general health,
sexual health, and pornography websites, by different filtering devices set at
different configurations. The study found that when the setting was less
restrictive, the filters failed to block much pornography but allowed more
legitimate speech from non-pornographic sites. When the setting was more
restrictive, the filters successfully blocked more pornography but erroneously
blocked more legitimate materials. Even at the least restrictive setting, the
filters incorrectly blocked about one out of ten non-pornographic, healthrelated websites. Thus, a parent wishing to screen pornography on a child’s
computer who sets the filter’s configuration to the most restrictive level can
expect the filter to incorrectly block an average of 24 percent of nonpornographic, legitimate websites.191 These results have been confirmed by
many studies, including those of the Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board working in conjunction with the National Research
Council.192
The Kaiser study illustrates the debate over filters’ effectiveness: filters are
potentially underinclusive, failing to block a significant amount of Internet
pornography, and overinclusive, blocking constitutionally protected speech
such as every instance of the word “breast” and thus, all breast cancer
websites.193 The report by Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
190. See id. See also Kosse, supra note 30, at 738-39 (describing the two categories of
filtering software: “predetermined blocking filters,” which require a user to select one of five
methods by which to block speech, or “rate-based filters,” which allow users “to rate sites by
creating descriptive labels”). For a thorough report on protecting children from Internet
pornography, including extensive analyses of filtering technologies, see YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY,
AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 51.
191. See Reder, supra note 189, at 148 (summarizing the Kaiser study and arguing that the
results demonstrate that filters block obscene materials at the high price of blocking non-obscene,
legitimate speech as well). To view the complete study, see The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, See No Evil: How Internet Filters Affect the Search for Online Health Information, at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/Internet_Filtering_exec_summ.pdf
(Dec. 2002).
192. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 58 ( “All of the
technologies of filtering that are discussed above have inherent uncertainties associated with
them, which lead them to make errors of both commission (misinterpreting a site as
inappropriate) or omission (not identifying an inappropriate site”); Kosse, supra note 30, at 739
(“Many of the [filtering] programs use some form of word-blocking that often leads to the
overinclusive blocking of constitutionally protected material . . . Critics of filtering software
argue that this technology can be underinclusive as well”).
193. See Kosse, supra note 30, at 739.
[M]any of the [filtering] programs use some form of word blocking that often leads to the
overinclusive blocking of constitutionally protected material. For example, certain
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and the National Research Council concluded that filters were inherently
fallible in terms of “overblocking” and “underblocking.”194 The report found
that, “[d]ue to the nature of filtering, these two types of errors are inevitable[,]”
and while “[i]t is possible to adjust” one’s filter “such that the occurrence of
one type of error is reduced[,] . . . reducing one type of error will always result
in increasing the other type of error.”195 Parents have also agreed with such
findings, concluding that filters are not sufficient means of addressing the
problem of children’s exposure to online pornography.196
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argues that this recognized ineffectiveness of
filters impelled efforts to design a statute allowing for direct government
regulation, efforts which resulted in COPA’s promulgation. 197 The Ashcroft II
majority disagreed with Justice Breyer’s assertion that filters were the status
quo and suggested that the government can implement incentive programs
encouraging the use of filtering software, thereby raising the bar above the
status quo.198 Indeed, Congress will likely respond to the majority’s
suggestion by enacting such an incentive program.199

programs banned the word “breast,” unintentionally blocking all websites dealing with
breast cancer. Critics of filtering software argue that this technology can be
underinclusive as well.
Id.
194. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 58.
195. Id.
196. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[F]iltering software depends on parents willing to decide where their children will surf the
Web and able to enforce that decision. As to millions of American families, that is not a
“reasonable possibility” because “[m]ore than 28 million school age children have both
parents or their sole parent in the work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at
home without supervision each week, and many of those children will spend afternoons
and evenings with friends who may well have access to computers and more lenient
parents.”
Id. See also YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 161. This report
explained that “filters cannot guarantee that inappropriate material will not be accessed” and thus
require adult supervision to ensure such. Id. at 304. Considering that the “number of unmarriedpartner homes increased by 60 percent” from 1999 to 2000, parents are increasingly unable to
supervise their children’s computer usage. Id. at 161.
197. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Filtering software . . . suffers
from . . . serious inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its
voluntary use”).
198. Id. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the] development [of
filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents . . . [i]t is incorrect, for that reason, to say
that filters are part of the current regulatory status quo”).
199. For a discussion of this issue, see Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (discussing the
likelihood of Congress providing incentives for the use of filters based on the holding in Ashcroft
II and that of American Library, where the Court held that public libraries’ use of Internet
filtering software did not violate patrons’ First Amendment rights and, therefore, CIPA did not
violate the Constitution) (citing American Library, 539 U.S. at 212).
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However, as suggested by the Kaiser study, filters have inherent
deficiencies that, even with incentive programs encouraging their use, render
filters less effective than COPA.200 Source regulation, such as COPA, does not
depend on filter-like machines that are fundamentally ill-equipped to
distinguish between context-dependent meanings of words, but rather it
requires online pornography providers themselves to employ age verification
systems that patrons must bypass before access is allowed.201Fundamentally,
encouraging more people to use filters more often will not affect their inherent
fallibility. Thereby, incentive programs that encourage widespread filter use
will not raise filters, as inherently fallible machines, above the filter-inclusive
status quo existing before COPA’s enactment.
Based on his finding that a filtering status quo is less effective than COPA,
Justice Breyer presented a convincing and interesting argument criticizing the
majority’s conclusion that filters are less restrictive than COPA.202 Justice
Breyer found that the majority, by inquiring as to whether a filtering status quo
is less restrictive than COPA, is essentially asking: Is it less restrictive to do
nothing (leave the filtering status quo alone) than to allow COPA to take effect
(thereby increasing the level of protection from that of a filtering status
quo)?203
Thus, conceptually, by finding filters are a less restrictive alternative to
COPA, the majority affirms the current regulatory status quo, one that, in the
words of Justice Breyer, “does not solve the ‘child protection’ problem.”204

200. See Reder, supra note 189, at 148 (summarizing the Kaiser study and arguing that the
results demonstrate that filters block obscene materials at the high price of blocking non-obscene,
legitimate speech as well). See also YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29,
at 58 (concluding that filters are inherently fallible in terms of “overblocking” and
“underblocking” and finding that, “[d]ue to the nature of filtering, these two types of errors are
inevitable” and while “[i]t is possible to adjust” one’s filter “such that the occurrence of one type
of error is reduced . . . reducing one type of error will always result in increasing the other type of
error”).
201. Carrie Netterville-Heieck, Note, Ashcroft v. ACLU: Protecting Our Children From
Harmful Online Material Without Infringing Upon First Amendment Rights, 4 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 95, 110 (2004) (explaining that COPA would require “age and identity
verification . . . to access adult Web sites”). For a thorough explanation of the various kinds of
age verification software, see YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 59.
202. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801-02. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Id. In his dissent, Justice Breyer, discussing the majority’s position that filters are a
reasonable alternative to COPA, stated that filters are:
part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which Congress enacted [COPA]. It is
always true, by definition, that the status quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law.
It is always less restrictive to do nothing than to do something. But “doing nothing” does
not address the problem Congress sought to address—namely that, despite the availability
of filtering software, children were still being exposed to harmful material on the Internet.
Id.
204. Id. at 2802.
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Irrespective of whether Congress enacts incentive legislation, parents should
be concerned that the Ashcroft II Court has affirmed the inherent fallibility of
filters, the status quo against which COPA was enacted, as a more effective
and less restrictive means of protecting children from online pornography.
D. The Supreme Court’s Protectivism of the Internet
While the majority and dissenting opinions in Ashcroft II clashed on
almost all points, from whether the Court should have decided the case on the
merits to whether COPA was more or less effective than filters,205 the Court
“achieved a near consensus” regarding the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate
COPA.206 Only Justice Scalia advocated a less rigorous level of scrutiny.207
The use of strict scrutiny in evaluating content-based restriction of sexual
speech has not always been the approach employed by the Court.208 The Court
usually regards obscene, sexually explicit speech as deserving only minimal
protection and therefore the Court will attempt to use a less stringent standard
in evaluating proposed restrictions on such speech.209 But faced with new and
different communication mediums, the Court has recently used a strict scrutiny
approach to content-based restrictions, thereby setting forth a major change in
the law with implications that would seem to limit future government attempts
to regulate sexual speech.210 In choosing to analyze COPA through the most

205. For an interesting theory as to the reasons for the differences between the majority and
dissenters in Ashcroft II, see Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 322. Corn-Revere postulates:
The difference between the Ashcroft II majority and the dissenters is even more extreme
than to say that for one side the glass is half full and for the other it is half empty. The
majority position is akin to saying that nothing prevents parents from getting a glass of
water if they want one. But to the dissenters, no such thing as a glass exists unless the
government provides it. To the extent the “glass” in this metaphor is the existence of
Internet filtering software, the divergent perspectives of the justices significantly affect
their respective evaluations of the technology.
Id.
206. Id. at 321 (stating that the Ashcroft II justices, “achieved a near consensus . . . that
regulating expression on the internet in the interest of protecting children requires the government
to satisfy strict First Amendment scrutiny”).
207. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority “in
subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny” because “[n]othing in the First Amendment entitles the type
of material covered by COPA to that exacting standard of review”). See also Corn-Revere, supra
note 14, at 321 (“Justice Scalia is the sole holdout for a less rigorous standard of review . . .”).
208. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is notable because the Court used
strict scrutiny in evaluating government regulation of sexual speech. Traditionally, non-obscene
sexual speech has been regarded as having little value and has been only minimally protected.”).
209. Id. See, e.g., Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (holding that obscene speech is not
afforded First Amendment protection and the government can thus regulate obscenity).
210. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333-34. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-69. The
Court utilized a strict scrutiny approach in analyzing CDA. In choosing to apply “the most
stringent review” of CDA, the Reno Court pointed out the importance of the Internet as a new,
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stringent lens available, the Ashcroft II Court conveyed a deliberate
protectivism of the Internet medium. 211
Speculation abounds as to the potential motivations for the Court’s
protectivism of the Internet. Perhaps this protectivism can be explained by
analyzing the nature of the Internet as an expressive medium. The nature of
the Internet medium is quite different from other more traditional media such
Certainly, the scope and range of
as the telephone and radio.212
communications possible over the Internet are vast and ever expanding.213 In
fact, the Internet was designed to be borderless, so as to allow global access
and avoid obstructions.214 This knowledge alone might lead the Court to be
wary of allowing regulatory attempts to reign-in an area of communications
with such new and indiscernible boundaries.215
Exacerbating the problems encountered from the nature of the Internet as
an ever-expanding medium is the extremely complex nature of that which
COPA seeks to regulate. The Court has always approached content-based
speech restrictions cautiously, but even more so is the Court wary of the
regulation of sexually explicit material.216 Formulating a constitutional statute
that regulates sexually explicit material is exceedingly difficult, requiring
legislators to “settle in the abstract upon a constitutionally acceptable category
of material that should be withheld from children,” which is problematic

immensely wide-ranging medium that, unlike radio or television, is less invasive because
communications over the Internet do not appear on an individual’s computer unbidden. Id.
211. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as a medium for communication and
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”).
212. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 32-33, 35 (listing the key
features of the internet medium that distinguish it from other, more traditional media, including
that the internet 1) “supports a high degree of interactivity,” 2) “is high decentralized,” 3) “is
intrinsically a highly anonymous medium,” and 4) “is a highly convenient medium”). The report
also asserts that the “capital costs of becoming an Internet publisher are relatively low” and that
“because nearly anyone can put information onto the Internet, the appropriateness, utility, and
even veracity of information on the Internet are generally uncertified and hence unverified.” Id. at
35.
213. See Kosse, supra note 30, at 721. Kosse comments on the expansive nature of the
Internet, stating that “[i]n 2002, the Internet was made up of more than 600 million users
worldwide[,]” and “[t]here are now more than 150 countries linked by the Internet.” Id.
214. Reder, supra note 189, at 146 & nn. 7 & 55 (“The Internet was designed both for global
access and to avoid obstructions; it is borderless”) (citing Parry Aftab, White Paper, Thinking
Outside the ‘Porn’ Box, Separating the Sexual Content Debate from Issues Relating to
Marketing, Commercial Practices, and Child Exploitation, at www.wiredsafety.org/resources/
pdf/xxx_whitepaper.pdf (April 2004)).
215. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794 (acknowledging that “[t]he technology of the Internet
evolves at a rapid pace”).
216. James, supra note 159, at S10 (“[Ashcroft II] represents an important reminder of the
justices’ long-standing suspicious attitude against content-based restrictions on speech”).
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considering “the geographic variation within the United States among
standards for assessing such material and the fact that so much covered
material originates abroad . . . .”217 Thus, the complex, hard-to-define nature
of both the Internet and sexually explicit material might render the Court
suspect of any legislative attempt at regulation on both fronts.
While the Court has not revealed its motivations behind affording the
Internet a high level of constitutional protection, after Ashcroft II little doubt
remains that the Court plans on treating the Internet very differently than other
media. In the past, the Court extended First Amendment protection to thennew technologies, namely radio, television, and cable television, only after
much reservation and debate. 218 However, faced with the newest technology
of the Internet, the Court has not hesitated to immediately apply the highest
level of constitutional protection.219
E.

When COPA Next Faces the Supreme Court

Any Supreme Court case decided by a 5-4 majority presents the possibility
that if the issue comes before the Court again, the passage of time or a change
in the composition of the Court might tip the scale in a different direction.220
As COPA’s fate is currently undecided, the issue of COPA’s constitutionality
will almost definitely come before the Supreme Court again.221 When it does,
1) President George W. Bush may have had nominated a new justice to the

217. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1458 n.353 (2004) (citing Ashcroft II as an example of a case were filtering was found an
attractive alternative “to direct regulation of sexually explicit content” because of the
complexities involved in regulating sexually explicit material).
218. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 309-10.
Importantly, the majority opinion [of Ashcroft II] reaffirmed the high level of
constitutional protection that the Court has accorded the Internet. This view of
technology and the First Amendment fundamentally reverses the approach the Court took
regarding speech transmitted via new communications technologies in the decades before
Reno v. ACLU. With other media, when they were new, the Court only grudgingly and
incrementally extended First Amendment protections.
Id.
219. Id. at 310 (“[W]ith the debut of the internet, the Court stressed that ‘our cases provide no
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium’”).
220. Craft, supra note 22, at 15 (“Not infrequently, the court decides cases by a 5-4 vote” and
thus, when such a decision goes before the Court again, “[a] one-vote swing could shift the
balance” on a particular issue).
221. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 320. Corn-Revere comments that on COPA’s status:
“[b]ecause the Court affirmed only the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction,
all of the issues that go to the merits still must be decided.” Id.
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Court, and 2) the cutting-edge technology issues involved in Ashcroft II will
likely have evolved.222
Even before the most recent presidential election, scholars and political
analysts emphasized that the outcome of the election would have great
implications in terms of changes in the Supreme Court’s composition.223 The
re-election of the conservative President George W. Bush, and his almost
certain opportunity to fill at least one vacancy on the Supreme Court, has great
implications as to how COPA’s constitutionality will be resolved.224 President
Bush’s choice in a Supreme Court replacement will certainly test his
conservative commitment as well as his post-election promise to Democrats:
“Americans are expecting a bipartisan effort.” 225 Liberal groups predict that
President Bush, in facing such a test, will likely chose a conservative
candidate, especially if he is called to replace the conservative Chief Justice
Rehnquist.226
However, an analysis of how a change in the Supreme Court might affect
COPA based on conservative or liberal tendencies might not be constructive.
Usually, in order of most conservative to least, the line-up of the justices are as
follows: 1) Justice Thomas, 2) Justice Scalia, 3) Justice Rehnquist, 4) Justice
Kennedy, 5) Justice O’Connor, 6) Justice Breyer, 7) Justice Souter, 8) Justice
Ginsburg, and 9) Justice Stevens.227 Ashcroft II serves as an example of a 5-4
opinion with no clear-cut conservative-liberal line: the 5-4 opinion was written
by Justice Kennedy (middle), joined by Justices Stevens (liberal), Souter
(liberal), Thomas (conservative), and Ginsburg (liberal), with whom Justices

222. Id. at 326. (“Much can happen as [Ashcroft II] makes its way through the lower courts,
including a potential change in the composition of the Supreme Court”).
223. The Presidential Election: How Will the Outcome Shape Our Legal System?, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 1, 2004, at 2 (arguing that the outcome of the 2004 election will
influence the legal system in terms of who the President will nominate for high court). See also
Tony Mauro, Judge Battles Likely to Mark Bush’s New Term, THE RECORDER, Nov. 8, 2004, at 1
(speculating that President Bush’s “presidential term [may be] marked by judicial confirmation
battles that rival or exceed in intensity those of Bush’s first term”).
224. See Craft, supra note 22, at 15 (“[C]ourt watchers predict that the winner of the 2004
presidential election will likely name two or more justices and leave his mark on the court for a
generation”).
225. Mauro, supra note 223, at 1 (“When or if a Rehnquist replacement is named, liberal
groups are gearing up for battle, in case Bush’s olive branch, offered to Democrats in postelection remarks, does not extend to nominations. ‘Americans are expecting a bipartisan effort
and results,’ Bush said . . .”).
226. Id. (“Liberal groups are skeptical of Bush’s comments, given the sharply conservative
bent of some of his first-term judicial nominees”).
227. E-mail from Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law,
to Anne S. Johnston, law student, Saint Louis University School of Law (Tuesday, Nov. 16, 2004
3:35 PM CST) (on file with author). Goldman noted that Justice Kennedy may sometimes “flip
flop with O’Connor depending on issue.” Id.
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Scalia (conservative), Breyer (liberal), Rehnquist (conservative) and O’Connor
(middle) dissented.228
Political party support of COPA has also crossed traditional conservativeliberal distinctions. Although the typical stereotype is that liberals oppose and
conservatives support COPA and related censorship issues,229 in many respects
support of COPA has been bipartisan. COPA was introduced in the Senate by
Republican Senator Dan Coats of Indiana.230 In the House, Republican
Representative Michael Oxley sponsored a near-identical bill.231 Democrat
President Bill Clinton signed COPA into law.232
Thus, while it is sure that President Bush will likely have an opportunity to
nominate at least one justice to the Supreme Court, the effect of his choice of a
conservative or a liberal appointment remains uncertain. When it comes to the
First Amendment issues like COPA, the justices do not follow a strictly
conservative or liberal voting pattern.233
Further, the passage of time between the Court’s recent decision to remand
Ashcroft II and when the Court faces COPA again might change the views of
some of the justices. The Ashcroft II Court stated specifically that among its
reasons for remanding the case was the practical justification that a remand
would allow the parties to present updated technological data regarding filters
and the Internet.234 Having a history of approaching the ever-changing Internet
medium with extreme caution,235 perhaps the justices need time to get
comfortable with the cutting-edge technology of the Internet and to understand
it as more than an abstract, malleable medium before deciding whether it can
be regulated. The scope of the Court’s analysis, curtailing the possible means
of protecting children from online pornography to one end of the spectrum or
the other, namely to either source regulation, like COPA, or end regulation,
like filters,236 indicates a narrow perception of the vastness of the Internet, of
the “grey” areas of cyberspace. If and when the justices do get acclimated to

228. Id.
229. Reder, supra note 189, at 151 (discussing how “liberal voices [usually] join the debate
by invoking the slippery slope of censorship”).
230. Wilt, supra note 20, at 378 (detailing the legislative history of COPA).
231. Id. at 378-79.
232. Id. at 376.
233. E-mail from Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law,
to Anne S. Johnston, law student, Saint Louis University School of Law, (Tuesday, Nov. 16,
2004 3:35 PM CST) (on file with author).
234. Id. at 2794.
235. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as a medium for communication and
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”).
236. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792 (finding that filters “impose selective restrictions on
speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source”).
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the Internet, their views regarding whether the government can constitutionally
regulate the Internet might broaden.
F.

Where Does Congress Go From Here?

Perhaps a more illuminating question is: how did the Supreme Court
expect Congress to use and interpret the Ashcroft II holding? Considering the
narrow practical focus of the Ashcroft II decision, there is no simple answer.237
Indeed, Congress’ expectations from Ashcroft II were quite different than
the result. Congress enacted COPA in response to the Court’s directives in
Reno that specifically addressed those aspects of CDA which rendered it
unconstitutional.238 Certainly the government expected that COPA would be
challenged by the ACLU and other groups.239 Undoubtedly, Congress
expected that whatever the outcome of such litigation, however long such
litigation lasted, there would eventually be an outcome: the Court would tell
Congress if and why COPA is or is not constitutional. But after years of
COPA litigation and having reached the Supreme Court twice, the Court has
again failed to provide Congress with any such insight, and as COPA begins its
third climb from the lower courts up, Congress is left wondering if there is an
end to the litigation process.240
What Congress can take from Ashcroft II is the understanding that the
Court has reservations, albeit unexplained reservations, about direct, source
regulation of the Internet by the government and, in lieu of such direct control,
seems more than ready to endorse filters as an alternative.241 Further, the
237. See Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 299 (describing Ashcroft II’s ruling as one of
“narrow practical focus”).
238. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 885. The majority states that
“[i]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this subject, in
particular the decision in Reno.” Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788. See also id. at 2805 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer’s dissent notes that “Congress passed [COPA] in response to the
Court’s decision in Reno . . . .” Id.
239. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 375 (“Unsurprisingly, the availability of pornography on the
Internet has led to extensive public criticism and, more importantly, to numerous legislative
attempts to restrict, regulate, reduce, burden and ban it. These endeavors have met with
consistent and considerable opposition . . .”). In describing CDA’s procedural history, Wilt notes
that, “[a]s is typical for an indecency statute, [after CDA was enacted] twenty plaintiffs
immediately filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the CDA, and alleging that it violated
the First and Fifth Amendments.” Id. at 376.
240. See Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 320 (“The [Ashcroft II] Court remanded the case to
update the factual record on technological developments relevant to its least restrictive means
analysis, but none of the issues that relate to the ultimate question of COPA’s constitutionality
have been resolved. Because the Court affirmed only the district court’s decision to issue a
preliminary injunction, all of the issues that go to the merits still must be decided”) (emphasis
added).
241. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792 (finding that filters “impose selective restrictions on
speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source”). See supra text

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

PLAYING HOT POTATO WITH COPA

515

Court displays a protectivism of the Internet which can be best explained by a
Court who views the Internet medium with trepidation,242 so unwilling to reach
within its nebulous boundaries that the Court prefers to remand the issue of
COPA’s constitutionality to the lower courts before making any decisions
regarding source regulation of the Internet.
In the meantime, while Congress waits for a substantive decision on the
merits, maybe it will, as the Ashcroft II majority suggested,243 enact incentive
programs encouraging filter usage.244 The court has upheld such programs
recently in application to libraries.245 But, inevitably, any incentive enactment
that extends beyond libraries will be challenged, sparking the litigation process
anew.246 Congress, confident that filters are not a solution to the problem,247
no doubt views any such incentive program as only temporary and only a
distant second place behind direct governmental regulation of the Internet.
However, perhaps incentive programs can, in the long run, give Congress
the ammunition it needs to convince the Court that filters are not effective
alternatives. Comprehensive data that might be compiled from such programs
may persuasively establish filters as an inadequate alternative to direct
governmental control. Unfortunately, this possibility is, at best, an optimistic
hope for an outcome of Ashcroft II, and, at worst, a fanciful and completely

accompanying note 236 (“The scope of the [Ashcroft II] Court’s analysis, curtailing the possible
means of protecting children from online pornography to . . . either “source” regulation, like
COPA, or “end” regulation, like filters, indicates a narrow perception of the . . . “grey” areas of
cyberspace. If and when the justices do get acclimated to the internet, their views regarding
whether the government can constitutionally regulate the internet might broaden”).
242. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as medium for communication and
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”).
243. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the]
development [of filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents”).
244. For a discussion of this issue, see Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (discussing the
likelihood of Congress providing incentives for the use of filters based on the holding in Ashcroft
II and that of American Library (where the Court held that “‘[b]ecause public libraries’ use of
Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights, CIPA does not
violate the Constitution . . .’”) (quoting American Library, 539 U.S. at 212 (2003)).
245. American Library, 539 U.S. at 194, 212 (upholding as constitutional the Children’s
Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”), which mandates that a public library may not receive some
types of Internet-related federal assistance unless that library’s internet safety policy includes
protective technology such as filters). For the complete CIPA statute, see 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)
(2003) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2002).
246. See Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (describing the legislation-followed-by-litigation
process of Internet regulation: “The Internet pornography industry is involved in a cat-and-mouse
game with those who try to regulate it”).
247. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Filtering software . . . suffers
from . . . serious inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its
voluntary use”).
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unfounded speculation. One outcome of Ashcroft II is definite: there is no end
in sight for the problem of children’s exposure to online pornography.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem that COPA aims to address, that of children’s exposure to
online pornography, is an immediate and urgent crisis. Undoubtedly,
Congress, parents, and the Internet industry as a whole would have preferred
that the Ashcroft II Court decided COPA’s constitutionality, stating clearly
what its decision implies, that the government has no role in regulating the
internet, rather than Ashcroft II’s narrow, practical decision. By endorsing
filters, which either overblock legitimate speech or underblock pornography,
and upholding the injunction prohibiting COPA from taking effect, the
Ashcroft II Court neither protected children nor protected speech. Truly, the
Ashcroft II decision frustrates to its core the congressional effort behind
COPA’s enactment.
It is no wonder that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress
is left disgruntled and confused. Indeed, in enacting COPA, Congress did
exactly what the Court told it to do in Reno. Nevertheless, after years of
litigation, the Court has twice refused to comment on COPA’s constitutionality
and now has stated in Ashcroft II that filters might be a less restrictive
alternative, an implication that effectively leaves COPA with uncertain,
doubtful constitutional viability. The government is left trying to tread water
with a law that is no longer afloat until it reaches the Supreme Court again, and
even then the Court might still harbor trepidation of the Internet as an
uncharted ocean of communication.
Meanwhile, Congress has no promising options: it can hope that a
favorable re-balancing of Ashcroft II’s 5-4 scales might occur before the Court
faces COPA again, or Congress might attempt to pass incentive programs to
encourage filter use. Considering that Congress has no faith in filters’ ability
to address the online pornography problem, such programs seem doomed from
the start. But while waiting for COPA’s slow assent to the Supreme Court,
Congress will likely go forward with filter incentive legislation as opposed to
waiting for an official Court ruling on COPA. Undoubtedly, Congress
understands that the Ashcroft II Court, in choosing to remand rather than
decide COPA’s fate, likely wanted to let the lower courts grapple with COPA’s
constitutionality first before making their own decision regarding the
regulation of the Internet’s vast technological terrain.
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